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STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Defendant disagrees with the Plaintiff's statement of the
Standard of Review.
The Defendant suggests that the essence of any cause of action
involves the violation of a "primary right" on which a "duty" of
the Defendant rests. The "primary right" and "duty" constitute the
cause of action.

Here the "primary right" that the Plaintiff

alleges was violated is his right of visitation, or the Right of
Filial Consortium.
The Right of "Filial Consortium" is not recognized in Utah as
a tort.

The Plaintiff cites no Utah authority for recognition of

that right, or of that duty or cause of action.
Contrary, the Defendant directs attention to In re Marriage of
Secrel 224 C.R. 591 (1986) ; Surina v. Lucev 214 C.R. 509 (1985) and
Borer v. American Airlines 13 8 C.R. 3 02 (1977) as support from a
sister state that interference with visitation is not actionable in
tort, and that no sister state has recognized the tort of Filial
Consortium.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The Plaintiff suggests in his brief that one of the issues on
review

is this case is the tort of intentional

infliction of

emotional distress. The trial court specifically found no cause of
action had been pled in the complaint for that tort. The Plaintiff
has not argued in his brief or otherwise, or even cited as error,
that there were

facts pled

to justify

a cause of action

for

emotional distress or that the trial court was wrong.

That issue

is simply not on appeal!
The only issue presented for appeal is, if a cause of action
exists

in

tort

for

intentional

interference

with

Plaintiff's

visitation rights, separate and apart from existing legislation.
However, in making such a request, the Plaintiff is in reality
forcing this court to:
1.

Judicially recognize a new tort of filial consortium;

2.

Establish some kind of standard for awarding damages for

a completely intangible injury;
3. Specifically rule that the legislature in Section 30-3-5,
3 0-3-11.1, and 3 0-3-16.1 Utah Code does not control, regulate and
supervise the care, custody and financial relationships between
parents and children; and that the best interests of the children
will be served in creating the new tort; and
4.

To recognize the peripheral problems associated with

recognition of the new tort of filial consortium and how they will
be handled in actions not presented in spousal context; i.e., where
a third party negligently injures both parents and children.

How

will the court evaluate intangible injuries in multiple claims
action.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Plaintiff's Statement of the case is accurate except for
the last paragraph thereof.
There never has been a finding, not even allegations in the
2

complaint,

that

the

Defendant

has

"continually

interfered and denied Plaintiff his visitation."

frustrated,

Such is not in

any record on appeal herein, and is not a fact pled or at issue in
this proceeding.
The Plaintiff has not urged nor cited as an issue of error
that the complaint was sufficient to state a cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Therefore, the only
issue on appeal is whether a parent can sue in tort for interfering
with visitation, bypassing existing legislation provided in Section
3 0-3-5, which

establishes

an

exclusive

remedy

to

deal with

visitation problems between parents.
The Plaintiff is seeking to have this court establish new law,
create a new cause of action in tort, for interference with
visitation.
The Plaintiff argues it is not creating "new law", but only
applying well recognized law of emotional distress to a different
body of law.
The trial court found the complaint did not allege a cause of
action for emotional distress and the Plaintiff has not argued
otherwise; but in the same breath the Plaintiff seems to indicate
a new cause of action arising out of emotional distress by finding
that a violation of visitation creates a tort of infliction of
emotional distress.
Since the issue of emotional distress was not pleaded nor
suggested to be error by the trial court, one wonders how emotional
distress now suddenly becomes the sole basis of the only cause of
3

action on which Plaintiff is relying for this appeal.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Plaintiff
suggest

that

he

father suggests that there are facts which

has

been

"routinely

and

consistently

denied

visitation by the Defendant mother." There are no such findings by
any court of those facts.

Further, the complaint in this matter

does not even allege such facts and nothing in the record on appeal
suggests such facts.
Instead, this case involves a mother and father who have been
in and out of court numerous times litigating issues of non-payment
of child support, modification of the divorce decree and contempt
for non-payment of child support.

Specifically on January 23,

1992, the Plaintiff was incarcerated in the Salt Lake County Jail
for contempt, for non-payment of child support.
It is agreed that the Plaintiff did file a complaint case
number 92093961CV in this court with one cause of action that is
founded solely on "interference with the right of visitation."

The

court in its bench ruling stated, "The complaint does not allege a
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress".
Lastly, the Plaintiff suggests that the action was commenced
"only after traditional remedies proved ineffective."

There is no

such finding by any court, nor is such alleged in the complaint in
this matter.

Such a suggestions is inappropriate and is not part

of the record on appeal.

4

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT
It is true that this matter was dismissed after Defendant
filed a motion to dismiss.

Defendant suggests that this court

review the order and bench ruling as to the basis of the trial
court's dismissal.
1)

However, it is essentially as follows:

The complaint does not state a cause of action

for

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
2)
action,

This court may not legislate or create a new cause of
when

the

legislature

has

already

provided

exclusive

remedies dealing with violation of court order visitation.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the basis: first,
Plaintiff failed to plead a cause of action for emotional distress;
and second, because there was no case law to support a new tort
cause of action for interference with visitation rights.
The Plaintiff has not argued as error that he did plead a
cause of action for emotional distress, nor did the Plaintiff
appeal on those grounds or cite as an issue on appeal that he did
properly plead a cause of action for emotional distress.

That

issue is not before this court.
The only issue that is before this court is whether this court
should recognize a new tort of filial consortium that has not been
recognized in any jurisdiction in these United States.
The Plaintiff would have this court believe that there is a
widespread movement adopting a new tort of intentional infliction
5

of emotional

distress

and

ordered child visitation.

intentional

interference with

court

Neither is the case.

The John Marshall Law Review article from which Plaintiff has
taken all of his supporting cases deals mostly with Federal child
napping cases and none really address the only issue presented by
Plaintiff; i.e., establishing a new tort of filial consortium.
Sheltra v. Smith 392 A2d 431 cited by Plaintiff is the only case
that is applicable to this action.
emotional distress.

It is an action founded on

However, the Plaintiff here has not pled such

a cause of action and the case is inappropriate as a reference.
California has recognized the problems of judicial legislation
and of adopting a new cause of action of Filial Consortium as have
other states.

None has recognized the tort.

Judicial recognition

of loss of consortium has always been narrowly circumscribed.
is an

intangible

compensate.

injury

for which money

does not

and

It

cannot

Not every loss can be made compensable in money.

Legal causation must exist and it is the duty of the courts to
locate the line of liability and the line which is essentially
political, remembering that it is not the duty of the courts to
legislate.
Lastly, to recognize

the new right and duty proposed

by

Plaintiff would only undermine the purpose of the Family Law Act
which is designed to regulate and supervise the care, custody and
financial support of minor children.
Neither the Plaintiff nor the author of the John Marshall Law
Review article have addressed these issues and problems, preferring
6

to avoid them and suggest that the new wave of the future is to
simply adopt a new tort law, broad brushing the issues without
facts

claiming

without

substantiation

that

the

"traditional

remedies are ' ineffective'!l.

DETAILED ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT I
THE TORT OF FILIAL CONSORTIUM DOES NOT EXIST IN UTAH
The only right the Plaintiff seeks in this action to enforce
by way of tort is his right of child visitation, or the right of
Filial Consortium.
The Plaintiff has cited no case law to support the existence
of that cause of action in Utah or in any other jurisdiction of any
sister state.
In California the court in Foy v. Greenblott (1983) 190 C.R.
84 stated:
The right of filial consortium has not been recognized
as a basis for a cause of action in California.
In In Re Marriage of Segel (1986) 224 C.R. 591 the court there,
faced with an identical fact situation that exists in the instant
action, held:
The judicial recognition of a cause of action for loss of
filial consortium would undermine the purpose of the
Family Law Act which is designed, among other things, to
regulate and supervise the care, custody and financial
support of minor children whose parents are the subjects
of dissolution proceedings.
The court in Segel cited additional policy reasons for not finding
a valid new cause of action of Filial Consortium including:
7

1.

Loss of consortium should be narrowly circumscribed, and

such an action would not be within the bounds;
2.

Cost of attempting to compensate for loss of society of

parent and child cannot be justified the social cost of the
tort ;
3.

Party must seek redress under Family Law Act;

4.

Public policy would be best served by not awarding damages

in situations where a claim is between parent and child.
Here

the

Plaintiff

is

asking

this

court,

with

no

authority

whatsoever, to recognize the tort of Filial Consortium.

No other

jurisdiction

judicial

recognizes

that

right.

The

policy

of

legislation is set forth in 64 Harvard Law Review 1188:
Judicial opinions abound in declarations to the effect
that a reviewing court must follow the law, and that
the policy, wisdom or justice of the law is for the
legislature and not the courts to determine.
If

that

right

is

to

be

recognized,

it

should

be

the

responsibility of the legislature and not this court.

ARGUMENT II
NO ACTION FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS HAS BEEN PLED OR APPEALED
As previously stated the trial court found that no cause of
action for emotional distress had been pled nor was an appeal taken
from that ruling.

The Plaintiff cannot now seek to argue emotional

distress as the basis of any claim as he does in his arguments I
and II.

They are simply not before the court.

Plaintiff's

complaint

only

states

that

the

Defendant

intentionally and effectively interfered with visitation.
8

Even by

the standards of Plaintiff's own authority, note 111 of the John
Marshall Law Review article, emotional distress has only been found
where one party's conduct has been so outrageous in character and
so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bound of decency,
with citations.

Such was not pled.

ARGUMENT III
NO TORT CAUSE OF ACTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS EXISTS IN UTAH
FOR INTERFERENCE WITH VISITATION BY A PARENT
All cases cited by Plaintiff that urge adoption of a new cause
of action for emotional distress deal with physical abduction from
a parent having lawful custody.

The sole exception is Sheltra v.

Smith, supra, but there the court stated a prima facia case must
include:
1.

Outrageous conduct;

2.

Acts done intentionally or with reckless disregard;

3.

Severe emotional distress to Plaintiff;

4.

Defendant's conduct must be proximate case of injury.

All other state courts have refused to recognize the tort for the
reasons set forth in Argument I of the Defendant.

Moreover, the

only other authority cited by Plaintiff is scattered lower federal
district court rulings.

It is well recognized that:

Where lower federal court precedents are divided or
lacking, state courts must necessarily make an
independent determination of federal law.
Rohr v. San Diego (1959) 51 C2d 759; 336 P2d 521
The

Defendant

believes that Utah has already

established

family law statutes to deal with disputes raised by the Plaintiff;
9

and that this court, by recognizing this tort, would be undermining
the

Family

Law

Act

and

essentially

be

conducting

judicial

legislation.

CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff suggests that "the trend" of national modern law
is to support recognition of the tort of emotional distress from
interfering with court ordered visitation.
support that position.

He offers no facts to

Even the John Marshall Law Review article

on page 312 indicates that different states are attempting to find
alternate ways to deal with parental visitation.
There is a trend among several jurisdictions to relax
custody modification standards as a means to solve the
problem of parental interference with visitation.
Further, there is no issue before this court dealing with
emotional distress as it was not pled nor cited as error, nor
appealed.
Thus, the Plaintiff seeks only that this court recognize a new
tort of Filial Consortium, providing no authority or basis under
which this court may act.
This appeal must be denied and the Defendant awarded legal
fees and costs in defending a frivolous appeal.

Date

J ' j r ^ l

^T^/

RICHARD S. NEMELKA
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this the
1993

I duly

personally

hand

delivered

/,)
Two

day of J
(2) copies

k, ^

,

of

the

foregoing Appellee's Brief to counsel for the Plaintiff at his
office address as follows;
GEORGE H. SEARLE
2805 South State St.
Salt Lake City, UT 84115
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HUSBAND AND WIFE
30-3-13.1. Establishment of family court division of district court
A family court division of the district court may be
established with the consent of the county commission in a county in which the district court determines that the social conditions in the county and the
number of domestic relations cases in the courts require use of the procedures provided for in this act in
order to give full and proper consideration to such
cases and to effectuate the purposes of this act. The
determination shall be made annually by the judge of
the district court in counties having only one judge,
and by a majority of the judges of the district court in
counties having more than one judge.
1969
30-3-14. Repealed.

1961

30-3-14.1. Designation of judges — Terms.
In a county within a judicial district having more
than one judge of the district court but having a population of less than 300,000 and in which the district
court has established a family court division, the presiding judge of such court shall annually, in the
month of September, designate at least one judge to
hear all cases under this act. In a county within a
judicial district having more than one judge of the
district court and having a population of more than
300,000 and in which the district court has established a family court division, the presiding judge of
such court shall annually, in the month of September,
designate at least two judges to hear all cases under
this act, and shall designate one of such judges as the
presiding judge of such family court division. Such
judge or judges shall serve on the family court division not less than one year and devote their time
primarily to divorce and other domestic relations
cases.
1969
30-3-15. Repealed.

1961

30-3-15.1. Appointment of domestic relations
counselors, family court commissioner, and assistants and clerks.
In each county having a population of less than
300,000 and in which the district court has established a family court division the district court judge
or judges may, and in each county having a population of more than 300,000 and in which the district
court has established a family court division the district court judges shall, by an order filed in the office
of the clerk on or before July 1 of each year, appoint
one or more domestic relations counselors, an attorney of recognized ability and standing at the bar as
femily court commissioner, and such other persons as
assistants and clerks as may be necessary, to serve
during the pleasure of the appointing power.
1969
30
3

^-15.2. R e p e a l e d .

1992

^"3-15.3. C o m m i s s i o n e r s — P o w e r s .
Commissioners shall:
(1) secure compliance with court orders;
(2) require completion of mandatory mediation
as provided in Sections 30-3-21 and 30-3-24;
j (3) require attendance at the mandatory
course as provided in Section 30-3-11.3;
(4) serve as judge pro tempore, master or ref1e
**ee on:
(a) assignment of the court; and
(b) with t h e written consent of the parties:
(i) orders to show cause where no contempt is alleged;

30-3-16.3

(ii) default divorces where t h e parties
have had marriage counseling b u t there
h a s been no reconciliation;
(iii) uncontested actions under the
Uniform Act on Paternity;
(iv) actions under t h e Uniform Civil
Liability for Support Act; and
' (v) actions under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act; and
(5) represent the interest of children in divorce
or a n n u l m e n t actions, and the parties in appropriate cases.
1992
30-3-15.4. Salaries a n d e x p e n s e s .
Salaries of persons appointed under the foregoing
sections shall be fixed by the board of commissioners
of t h e county in which they serve. Office space, furnishings, equipment and supplies for family court
commissioners and conciliation staff shall be provided by t h e board of county commissioners. T h e expenses and salaries of family court commissioners
and conciliation staff shall be paid from county funds
under Section 17-16-7.
1969
30-3-16. Repealed.

i96i

30-3-16.1. Jurisdiction of family court division
— Powers.
Whenever any controversy exists between spouses
which mav. unless a reconciliation is acnieved. result
in the dissolution or annulment of the marriage or in
the disruption of the household, and there is a child of
t h e s p o u s e s nr eithpr nf thpm iinrter t h e flffe of 17

years whose welfare might be affected, t h e family
court division of the district court shall have jurisdiction over t h e controversy, over the parties a n d over
all persons having any relation to t h e controversy
and may compel attendance before the court or a domestic relations counselor of the parties or other persons related to t h e controversy. The court m a y make
orders in divorce or conciliation proceeding as it
deems necessary for the protection of t h e family interests.
1969
30-3-16.2. Petition for conciliation.
Prior to t h e filing of any action for divorce, annulment, or separate maintenance, either spouse or both
spouses may file a petition for conciliation in t h e family court division invoking t h e jurisdiction of t h e
court for t h e purpose of preserving the marriage by
effecting a reconciliation between t h e parties or a n
amicable settlement of the controversy between them
so as to avoid litigation over the issues involved. 1969
30-3-16.3. Contents of petition.
The petition for conciliation shall state:
(1) A controversy exists between the spouses
and request the aid of the pourt to effect a reconciliation or an amicable settlement of the controversy.
(2) The name and age of each child under the
age of 17 years whose welfare may be affected by
the controversy.
(3) The name and address of the petitioner or
the names and addresses of the petitioners.
(4) If the petition is filed by one spouse, only,
the name and address of the other spouse as a
respondent.
(5) The name, as a respondent, of any other
person who has any relation to the controversy
and, if known to the petitioners, the address of
such person.

30-3-10.6

HUSBAND AND WIFE

maintenance, or alimony under this chapter or Title
30, Chapter 4, provides a different time for payment,
all monthly payments of support, maintenance, or alimony provided for in the order or decree shall be due
one-half by the 5th day of each month, and the remaining one-half by the 20th day of that month. 1985
30-3-10.6. Payment under child support order
— Judgment.
(1) Each payment or installment of child or spousal
support under any child support order, as defined by
Subsection 62A-11-401(3), is, on and after the date it
is due:
(a) a judgment with the same attributes and
effect of any judgment of a district court, except
as provided in Subsection (2);
(b) entitled, as a judgment, to full faith and
credit in this and in any other jurisdiction; and
(c) not subject to retroactive modification by
this or any other jurisdiction, except as provided
in Subsection (2).
(2) A child or spousal support payment under a
child support order may be modified with respect to
any period during which a petition for modification is
pending, but only from the date notice of that petition
was given to the obligee, if the obligor is the petitioner, or to the obligor, if the obligee is the petitioner.
(3) For purposes of this section, "jurisdiction"
means a state or political subdivision, a territory or
possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
(4) The judgment provided for in Subsection (l)(a),
to be effective and enforceable as a lien against the
real property interest of any third party relying on
the public record, shall be docketed in t h e district
court in accordance with Sections 78-22-1 and
62A-11-311.
1989
30-3-11. Repealed.

1961

30-3-11.1. Family Court Act — Purpose.
It is the public policy of the state nf Utah to
strengthen the family life foundation of our society
and reduce the social and economic costs to the state
resulting from broken homes and to take reasonable
measures to preserve marriages, particularly where
minor children are involved. The purposes of this act
are to protect the rights of children and to promote
the public welfare by preserving and protecting family life and the institution ot matrimony py providing
the courts with further assistance for family counseling, the reconciliation of spouses and the amicable
settlement of domestic and family controversies! 1969
30-3-11.2. Appointment of counsel for child.
If, in any action before any court of this state involving the custody or support of a child, it shall appear in the best interests of the child to have a separate exposition of the issues and personal representation for the child, the court may appoint counsel to
represent the child throughout the action, and the
attorney's fee for such representation may be taxed as
a cost of the action.
1969
30-3-11.3. Mandatory educational course for divorcing parents — Pilot program —
Purpose — Curriculum — Exceptions.
(1) There is established a mandatory course for divorcing parents as a pilot program in the third and
fourth judicial districts to be administered by the Administrative Office of the Courts from July 1,1992, to

130

March 1, 1994. The mandatory course is designed to
educate and sensitize divorcing parties to their children's needs both during and after the divorce process.
(2) The Judicial Council shall adopt rules to implement and administer this pilot program.
(3) As used in this section, both parties to a divorce
action who have a child or children and the plaintiff
has filed an action in the judicial district as defined in
Section 78-1-2.1 where the pilot program is administered are governed by this section. As a prerequisite
to receiving a divorce decree, both parties are required to attend a mandatory course on their children's needs after filing a complaint for divorce and
receiving a docket number unless waived under Section 30-3-4. If waived, the court may permit the divorce action to proceed.
(4) The mandatory course shall instruct both parties about divorce and its impacts on:
(a) their child or children;
(b) their family relationship; and
(c) their financial responsibilities for their
child or children.
(5) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall
administer the course pursuant to Title 63, Chapter
56, Utah Procurement Code, through private or public contracts and organize the pilot program in the
third and fourth judicial districts as defined in Section 78-1-2.1.
(6) The certificate of completion shall constitute
evidence to the court of course completion by the parties.
(7) (a) Each party shall pay the costs of the course
to the independent contractor providing the
course at the time and place of the course.
(b) Each party who is unable to pay the costs of
the course may attend the course without payment upon a prima facie showing of
impecuniosity as evidenced by an affidavit of
impecuniosity filed in the district court. In those
situations, the independent contractor shall be
reimbursed for its costs from the appropriation to
the Administrative Office of the Courts to the
"Mandatory Educational Course for Divorcing
Parents Program." Before a decree of divorce
shall be entered, the court shall make a final
review and determination of impecuniosity and
may order the payment of the costs if so determined.
(8) Appropriations from the General Fund for the
"Mandatory Educational Course for Divorcing Parents Program" shall be used to pay for the costs for
the indigent parent who makes a showing as provided
in Subsection 30-3-11.3(7)(b).
(9) The Administrative Office of t h e Courts shall
adopt a program to evaluate t h e effectiveness of the
mandatory course. Progress reports shall be provided
semi-annually on the date of implementation of this
section and on the results beginning J a n u a r y 1,1993.
The results shall be reported to the Judiciary Interim
Committee on a bi-annual basis.
1992
30-3-12. Courts to exercise family counseling
powers.
Each district court of the respective judicial districts, while sitting in matters of divorce, annulment,
separate maintenance, child custody, alimony and
support in connection therewith, child custody in habeas corpus proceedings, and adoptions, shall exercise
the family counseling powers conferred by this act.
1969

30-3-13. R e p e a l e d .

1961

127
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(h) irreconcilable differences of the marriage;
(i) incurable insanity; or
(j) when the husband and wife have lived separately under a decree of separate maintenance of
any state for three consecutive years without cohabitation.
(4) A decree of divorce granted under Subsection
(3)(j) does not affect the liability of either party under
any provision for separate maintenance previously
granted.
(5) (a) A divorce may not be granted on the
grounds of insanity unless: (i) the defendant has
been adjudged insane by the appropriate authorities of this or another state prior to the commencement of the action; and (ii) the court finds
by the testimony of competent witnesses that the
insanity of the defendant is incurable.
(b) The court shall appoint for the defendant a
guardian ad litem, who shall protect the interests
of the defendant. A copy of the summons and
complaint shall be served on the defendant in
person or by publication, as provided by the laws
of this state in other actions for divorce, or upon
his guardian ad litem, and upon the county attorney for the county where the action is prosecuted.
(c) The county attorney shall investigate the
merits of the case and if the defendant resides out
of this state, take depositions as necessary, attend the proceedings, and make a defense as is
just to protect the rights of the defendant and the
interests of the state.
(d) In all actions the court and judge have jurisdiction over the payment of alimony, the distribution of property, and the custody and maintenance of minor children, as the courts and
judges possess in other actions for divorce.
(e) The plaintiff or defendant may, if the defendant resides in this state, upon notice, have
the defendant brought into the court at trial, or
have an examination of the defendant by two or
more competent physicians, to determine the
mental condition of the defendant. For this purpose either party may have leave from the court
to enter any asylum or institution where the defendant may be confined. The costs of court in
this action shall be apportioned by the court. 1987
30-3-2. Right of husband to divorce.
The husband may in all cases obtain a divorce from
his wife for the same causes and in the same manner
as the wife may obtain a divorce from her husband.
1953

30-3-3. Temporary alimony and suit money.
The court may order either party to pay to the clerk
a sum of money for the separate support and maintenance of the adverse party and the children, and to
enable such party to prosecute or defend the action.
1953

30-3-4.: Pleadings — Findings — Decree — Seal
ing.
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and]
signed by t h e plaintiff or plaintiffs attorney.
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted
upon default or otherwise except upon legal evi-[
dence t a k e n in t h e cause.
*' (c) If t h e plaintiff and the defendant have a
child or children and t h e plaintiff h a s filed an|
action in t h e judicial district as defined in Sec
tion 78-1-2.1 where t h e pilot program shall be
administered, a decree of divorce may not be
granted until both parties have attended a man-j

30-3-5

datory course provided in Section 30-3-11.3 and
have presented a certificate of course completion
to the court. The court may waive this requirement, on its own motion or on the motion of one
of the parties, if it determines course attendance
and completion are not necessary, appropriate,
feasible, or in the best interest of the parties,
(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be
held before the court or the court commissioner
as provided by Section 78-3-31 and rules of the
Judicial Council. The court or the commissioner
in all divorce cases shall make and file findings
and decree upon the evidence.
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, m a y be
sealed by order of the court upon the motion of either
party. The sealed portion of the file is available to the
public only upon an order of the court. The concerned
parties, the attorneys of record or attorney filing a
notice of appearance in the action, the Office of Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings h a s applied for or is receiving public assistance, or the court
have full access to the entire record. This sealing does
not apply to subsequent filings to enforce or amend
the decree.
1992
30-3-4.1 t o 30-3-4.4.

Repealed.

1990

30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance
and health care of parties and children
— Division of debts — Court to have
continuing jurisdiction — Custody and
visitation — Termination of alimony —
Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court
may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The
court shall include the following in every decree of
divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the
payment of reasonable and necessary medical
and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable
cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children;
and
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify
respective creditors or obligees, regarding
the court's division of debts, obligations, or
liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of
-orders.
_—
—
(2) The court may include, in* an order determining
child support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial
parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may include an
order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide the
day care for the dependent children, necessitated by
the employment or training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing iurjfiftirtmn fn malr*
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and
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maintenance of the parties, the custody of the chil-\ pertaining to the same family member named in the
dren and their support, maintenance, health, and* protective order.
1991
dental care, or the distribution of the property and
1985
obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 30-3-6. R e p e a l e d .
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents,
grandparents, and other relatives, the court shall 30-3-7. When d e c r e e b e c o m e s absolute.
I (1) The decree of divorce becomes absolute:
consider the welfare of the child.
(a) on the date it is signed by the court and
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides
entered by the clerk in the register of actions if
otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay I
both the parties who have a child or children and
alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates \
the plaintiff has filed an action in the judicial
upon the remarriage of thatformerspouse. However,
district as defined in Section 78-1-2.1 where the
if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab
pilot program is administered and have cominitio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party I
pleted attendance at the mandatory course propaying alimony is made a party to the action of an- /
vided in Section 30-3-11.3 except if the court
nulment and his rights are determined.
waives the requirement, on its own motion or on
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony
the motion of one of the parties, upon determinato a former spouse terminates upon establishment by
tion that course attendance and completion are
the party paying alimony that the former spouse is
not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in the
residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if
best interest of the parties;
it is further established by the person receiving ali(b) at the expiration of a period of time the
mony that that relationship or association is without
court may specifically designate, unless an apany sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume.
peal or other proceedings for review are pending;
(7) When a petition for modification of child cusor
tody or visitation provisions of a court order is made
and denied, the court may order the petitioner to pay
the reasonable attorney's fees expended by the prevailing party in t h a t action, if the court determines
t h a t the petition was without merit and not asserted
in good faith.
1991
30-3-5.1.

P r o v i s i o n for income withholding in
child support order.
Whenever a court enters an order for child support,
it shall include in the order a provision for withholding income as a means of collecting child support as
provided in Title 78, Chapter 45d.
1985

30-3-5.2.

Allegations of child a b u s e or child sex-

ual abuse — Investigation.
When, in any divorce proceeding or upon a request
for modification of a divorce decree, an allegation of
child abuse or child sexual abuse is made, implicating
either party, the court shall order t h a t an investigation be conducted by the Division of Family Services
within the Department of H u m a n Services in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 4, P a r t 5. A final
award of custody or visitation may not be rendered
until a report on t h a t investigation is received by the
court. T h a t investigation shall be conducted by the
Division of Family Services within 30 days of the
court's notice and request for an investigation. In reviewing this report, the court shall comply with Section 78-7-9.
1992

30-3-5.5. Petition to protect abused child — Jurisdiction under this chapter.
(1) A person who has filed a complaint under this
chapter may also file a petition with the district court
for a protective order for the protection of any children residing with either party to the action under
this chapter. The petition and procedures shall be the
same as for the issuance of protective orders in the
juvenile court under Sections 78-3a-20.5, 78-3a-20.6,
78-3a-20.7, 78-3a-20.8, 78-3a-20.9, and 78-3a-20.10.
The court or the cohabitant may use the protections
provided in this chapter and Title 78, Chapter 3a,
Juvenile Courts, and when necessary, those protections under Title 76, Chapter 5, Offenses Against the
Person, which provide for criminal prosecution.
(2) A person who has obtained a protective order
pursuant to this section shall notify any other court
in which another action is pending or order is issued

(c) when the court, before the decree becomes
absolute, for sufficient cause otherwise orders.
(2) The court, upon application or on its own motion for good cause shown, may waive, alter, or extend a designated period of time before the decree
becomes absolute, but not to exceed six months from
the signing and entry of the decree.
1992
30-3-8. Remarriage — When unlawful.
Neither party to a divorce proceeding which dissolves their marriage by decree may m a r r y any person other t h a n the spouse from whom the divorce was
granted until it becomes absolute. If an appeal is
taken, the divorce is not absolute until after affirmance of the decree.
1988
30-3-9.

Repealed.

1969

30-3-10. Custody of children in case of separation or divorce — Custody consideration.
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children
are separated, or their marriage is declared void or
dissolved, the court shall make an order for the future
care and custody of the minor children as it considers
appropriate. In determining custody, the court shall
consider the best interests of the child and the past
conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of
the parties. The court may inquire of the children and
take into consideration the children's desires regarding the future custody, but the expressed desires are
not controlling and the court may determine the children's custody otherwise.
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider,
among other factors the court finds relevant, which
parent is most likely to act in the best interests of the
child, including allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent as the
court finds appropriate.
1988

30-3-10.1. Joint legal custody defined.
In this chapter, '^joint legal custody":
(1) means the sharing of the rights, privileges,
duties, and powers of a parent by both parents,
where specified;
(2) may include an award of exclusive authority by the court to one parent to make specific
decisions;

